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Abstract 
 
Scholarly analyses of media have tended to view the media text (e.g. film / 
programme / article) as the logical site of enquiry.  However, this focus on 
the text has often resulted in a privileging of the text as the locus of 
meaning.  The validity of textual analysis as a research method has 
increasingly been called into question due to the influence of 
poststructuralist theories and the critique of textually-based research 
emerging from the ‘new audience studies’.  In this paper I examine the 
debates surrounding texts, audiences and meanings from a 
poststructuralist perspective.  I argue that the rethinking of subjectivity 
achieved by discourse theory provides the key to a new conception of 
textual analysis, which remains a vital and rewarding approach to the 
study of media and culture. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
This paper arises out of research on masculinities in New Zealand films done for 
my master’s thesis (Havemann, 1997).  I began my thesis research planning to 
examine how selected New Zealand films had represented men, and so deduce 
what sort of underlying messages about masculinity were contained within the 
texts.  However, the more theory and research I read, the more it seemed that I 
had been misguided in thinking I could discover anything at all.  Meaning, it 
seemed, could not be said to reside in the text at all. Within certain circles at least, 
the foundations of textual analysis were threatening to crumble under the weight 
of challenging critiques.  These critiques seemed to emanate both from a 
poststructuralist rejection of the notion of fixed textual meaning and from 
audience researchers who wanted to put the readings of texts made by audiences 
(rather than media texts themselves) centre stage.  
 
This paper represents my attempt to make sense of the debates surrounding the 
text/audience encounter. I especially focus on the implications of various 
positions for textual methodologies.  Finally, I suggest that a model of texts and 
subjectivity drawn from discourse theory is compatible with, and productive for, 
both text and audience based methods of research.  
 
 
M e a n i n g  a s  i d e o l o g y :  
t h e  t e x t  a n d  i t s  s u b j e c t s  
 
During the 1970s researchers began to take up the concept of ideology in the 
service of a politically engaged critique of popular/‘mass’ culture.  Within film 
studies, theorists inspired by the rise of structuralism attempted to unlock the 
process by which the screen ‘apparatus’ communicated its message to the 
‘spectator’.  Morley (1992) has used the term ‘screen theory’ to refer to this 
combination of semiotics, psychoanalysis and ideological theory which arose to 
challenge the dominant approaches within the discipline.   
 
It was the concept of ideology as described in the work of Louis Althusser 
(1971), in conjunction with semiotic and psychoanalytical theories, which 
enabled 1970s film theorists to move beyond commonsense understandings of 
the audience, recasting the hypothetical viewer as both ‘spectator’ and ‘subject’.  
According to Althusser, the subject (individual, self) is constituted through a 
Leo Havemann  Method or Madness? 
4 
process of ideological ‘interpellation’ (hailing).  The putative subject becomes 
subjected by recognising him- or her- self as the one interpellated.  Ideology 
exists as a unified force which acts to reproduce the conditions of production (i.e. 
capitalism, in some feminist theories also including patriarchy) through various 
apparatuses. The media are described as ideological state apparatuses (ISAs).   
 
The Althusserian model of ideology was taken up by left-wing film theorists who 
wished to investigate the ideological work being done by film, which they 
renamed the ‘cinematic apparatus’ (Mayne, 1993).  This model represented a 
politically attuned alternative to the largely apolitical mainstream of film theory 
(which was dominated by the realism/formalism and genre/auteur debates). The 
ideological model was especially useful to feminists who, according to Teresa de 
Lauretis (1987), wished to examine “not only how gender is constructed by the 
given technology, but also how it becomes absorbed subjectively by each 
individual whom that technology addresses” (p. 13).  Prominent feminist film 
theorists such as Mulvey (1975) and Gledhill (1978) consequently argued for a 
shift of focus away from the content of films (‘images of women’) and toward the 
workings of the apparatus itself.   
 
 
Ideology 1.0: Screen theory 
 
TEXT AUDIENCE 
 
Active  
 
Site of meaning; textual analysis is 
logical research method 
 
The media are Ideological State 
Apparatuses (Althusser); texts act to 
reproduce ideology / conditions of 
production 
 
Passive 
 
An idealised construct ‘implied’ in the 
text;  ‘actual audiences’ (Ang) are 
ignored  
Receivers of ideological textual meaning; 
only those with special skills (e.g. 
knowledge of psychoanalysis, semiotics) 
are able to read texts ‘against the grain’ 
 
 
 
Within screen theory, “the analysis of textual structures alone was thought to be 
sufficient to comprehend how viewers are implicated in the texts they encounter” 
(Ang, 1989, p. 99).  Researchers working within this framework were very much 
concerned with audiences, but elided actual viewers into an implied viewer 
constructed by the text (Ang, 1989, 1991; Mayne, 1993; Hughes, 1994).   
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Although screen theory provided a productive route into the realm of sexual 
difference and representation, its most difficult absence (the failure to address the 
diversity of readings made by actual audiences) brought researchers to an 
unfortunate impasse. If texts are always already ideologically determined and 
determining, then any analysis must inevitably lead to the same depressing 
conclusion of ‘more of the same’ audience powerlessness against ideology 
(Gamman and Marshment, 1988; Tasker, 1991). 
 
While the approach of screen theory was both fresh and influential, it was not 
without its critics. Although they shared screen theory’s commitment to 
ideological analysis, early cultural studies theorists nevertheless saw a need for a 
revised model of the text/audience relationship. The beginnings of ‘active 
audience theory’ can be traced to the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
(CCCS) at the University of Birmingham in the 1970s. Members of the Centre’s 
media group questioned the textual determinism of screen theory.  According to 
Tasker (1993), screen theory promoted a notion of two ‘levels of meaning’ in the 
text, the first being the “overt pleasures” available to the audience and the second 
being “the covert ideological project” discernible to the researcher (p. 64). In 
contrast to this, Stuart Hall (1980) of the CCCS introduced a theory of encoding 
and decoding, according to which ideology is encoded into the text, but the 
viewer is understood to possess a degree of autonomy in the decoding process.  
Hall described the text as polysemic, meaning that multiple meanings were 
available to the decoder, but he warned that this did not equate to an infinite 
variety of readings. Instead, readings of the text were said to fall into three 
categories: preferred, negotiated, and oppositional. 
 
The three possible reading positions represent the stance of the decoder of the text 
toward the ideological message encoded in it.  A preferred reading is one which 
unproblematically ‘reads off’ the intended message; so, the preferred reading is 
not unlike the reading made by the interpellated spectator of screen theory. These 
categories are problematic, however, for it is unclear how a reading can be 
identified as ‘preferred’. Morley sums up the dilemma: “is the preferred reading a 
property of the text, the analyst or the audience?” (1992, p. 122). This 
categorisation of audience diversity into three generalised reading factions can 
only make sense if the text is considered to have an inherent message or meaning. 
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Ideology 2.0: encoding/decoding 
 
TEXT AUDIENCE 
 
Active 
 
Transmission 
 
Polysemic yet containing a pre-encoded 
‘preferred reading’ (Hall) which 
functions to reproduce the dominant 
ideology / social status quo 
Active 
 
Reception 
 
Producing readings which can be 
ideologically ‘preferred’ (or ‘dominant’), 
‘negotiated’, or ‘oppositional’ - activity is 
largely limited to accepting or rejecting 
the message 
 
 
An apparent incompatibility separates those practices which aim to analyse the 
text and those which would instead analyse its reception. However, this evident 
methodological discrepancy has tended to obscure an underlying commonality 
between the two ideological approaches described above, which actually share an 
understanding of communication as transmission. As Sless (1986) has argued, 
the commonplace acceptance of a transmission model of communication relies 
upon the the image of a mechanical, technological transfer of information from A 
to B. The use of this metaphor (which in the 20th century has taken over from a 
metaphor of communication as sharing) promotes the idea that a particular 
message (which is distinct from its sender and receiver) can be communicated in 
a one-way, top-down direction from sender to receiver. But the transmission that 
occurs from, for example, TV station to TV set, is not the equivalent of the 
meaning making process undertaken by an audience; as such this image falls 
short of capturing the complexity of the communication process.1
 
   
The ideological approaches to media, perceiving media as a conduit (‘apparatus’) 
enabling the transmission of ideology, have tended to work from generalisations 
about an undifferentiated audience of (apparently) ‘empty vessels’, ready to be 
interpellated as subjects, and an undifferentiated media (‘the mass media’). These 
certainties could not last, however. As researchers became more interested in the 
agency and diversity of audience members, the subject of media studies was 
transformed. Poststructuralist and feminist theories of subjectivity and discourse 
                                                 
1 Joshua Meyrowitz (1994) has pointed out that many of our understandings of media rely 
upon underlying metaphors (such as the persuasive metaphor of media as conduits, simply 
delivering the content). 
Leo Havemann  Method or Madness? 
7 
have been a key influence in cultural and media studies work from the 1980s 
onwards. Before considering how such theories have been productive in relation 
to media, I will sketch in some of their salient features. 
 
 
F r o m  ‘ t h e  s u b j e c t ’  t o  ‘ s u b j e c t i v i t i e s ’  
 
While many authors (e.g., Henriques et al., 1984; Weedon, 1989; Davies, 1991) 
have contributed to the discussion of discourses and subjectivities, a particular 
debt is owed to Michel Foucault whose various explorations of questions of 
power and discourse had at their core a common goal, namely “to create a history 
of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 208). Discourse theory understands subjectivity as the state of 
being (a) subject: being subjected by multiple discourses, and at the same time 
experiencing a sense of continuous selfhood. The key to this theory of 
subjectivity is that it is discursively constructed, and therefore multiple and 
contradictory. This more complex picture stands in contrast to the somewhat 
‘brainwashed’ image of Althusser’s subject (Henriques et al., 1984). 2
 
 The 
discursive subject is formed and re-formed through its multiple significations 
across a plethora of discourses, which may be compatible or clashing (Henriques 
et al., 1984). As Bronwyn Davies (1991) explains:     
Subjectivity is constituted through those discourses in which the 
person is being positioned at any one point in time, both through their 
own and others’ acts of speaking / writing.  One discourse that 
contradicts another does not undo one’s constitution in terms of the 
original discourse. One’s subjectivity is therefore necessarily 
contradictory. (p. 43) 
 
In discourse theory, subjects, objects, and power relations are produced within 
discourses; discourses have material effects. Discourse theory perceives a world 
acted on and transformed by discourse, as against referential models of language 
as simply reflecting or describing reality.  The objects discussed, categorised 
and evaluated by discourse are actually constituted within discourse, or rather 
within particular discourses, which impose their own conditions of possibility on 
particular statements, according to what Foucault (1980) called a “‘regime’ of 
                                                 
2 The limitations of an ideological theory of the subject are expressed by Elspeth Probyn 
(1993) in her statement that “it is hard to imagine speaking positions that arise from Althusser’s 
conception of the subject” (p.135). 
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truth” (p. 133). The truth or falsity of a potential statement is also regulated 
according to the position of the subject doing (or perceived to be doing) the 
speaking (Foucault, 1981; Fairclough, 1992).  A subject must have access to the 
position of ‘legitimate knower’ in order to make certain statements. Within any 
discourse, then, there are different subject positions, which are not freely 
available, but rather open only to certain categories of person (Fairclough, 1992; 
Weedon, 1987). For example, within medical discourses, the patient may be able 
to describe symptoms but only the doctor can produce a diagnosis.  This 
positioning of subjects by discourse then also implies a field of power relations; 
to be a subject is to be more or less powerful in relation to other subjects. 
 
Foucault recognised that different discourses could coexist, producing ‘parallel 
realities’ and different regimes of truth (Foucault, 1980, 1981).  However, as 
Wendy Hollway (1984) notes, in practice, Foucault’s studies concentrated on 
particular historically existing discourses tied to particular institutional contexts.  
Hollway, a feminist psychologist, decided to modify Foucault’s method  
 
in order to understand how at a specific moment several coexisting 
and potentially contradictory discourses concerning sexuality make 
available different positions and different powers for men and 
women. (p. 230)    
 
It was in the context of this research that Hollway developed her theory of 
investment, according to which a person takes up the subject position made 
available in one discourse rather than another neither randomly, nor unwillingly, 
but because this position affords a relative power: “there will be some satisfaction 
or pay-off or reward” (p. 238).   
 
The advantage of this version of subjectivity is that it encompasses as sense of 
identity, of being a person, situated historically and culturally. Crucially, this 
subjectivity is envisioned as multiple, shifting, and at times contradictory rather 
than unitary, fixed, or internally consistent. Due to its fragmented nature, the 
discursive subject is both acted on and active within the field of discourses, 
constantly re-produced and re-producing itself (Henriques et al., 1984; Davies, 
1991). Perceptions that poststructuralists have effected some kind of erasure of 
the subject, or imagine a world manufactured out of discourse, are inaccurate. 
Poststructuralist discourse theory offers agency - an active role for the subject in 
the (trans)formation of both discourse and self - which is nevertheless 
constrained by a field of unequal discursive and power relations. 
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It seems crucial to me that, in constructing a model of the audience’s relationship 
with the text, the model does not prejudge the content or behaviour of either. The 
space for identity created within the discursive model fills a vacuum in the 
understanding of media audiencehood I am working towards. The recognition of 
differences both between and within categories of persons (such as ‘women’ and 
‘men’) provides a framework for considering how persons might be differently 
positioned by discourses according to configurations of gender, ‘race’, class (to 
name just three). Indeed, this suggestion is borne out by audience research 
focusing on particular socially-constituted groups (see for e.g. Schlesinger et al., 
1992; Simms, 1995; Bobo, 1995). Such group memberships have been seen as a 
kind of ‘vantage point’ from which meanings (both interpretive and evaluative) 
can be made from a cultural representation. We can see each person as having 
access to a particular range of discourses to draw upon when reading (or 
authoring) a text. Most audience members could be assumed to have access to 
those discourses which are hegemonic or prevalent within relevant social and 
historical contexts. However, an audience member might also have access to 
what we might call ‘other’ discourses: the alternative or counter-hegemonic 
discourses of those designated as other, as opposed to hegemonic discourses 
about others. Consequently, meaning production is not simply confined to 
known/available discourses, but likely to be tied to a person’s investments within 
particular discourses. 
 
 
M e a n i n g  a s  p r o d u c t i v i t y :  
t h e  ‘ N e w  A u d i e n c e  S t u d i e s ’  
 
John Corner (1991) uses the term ‘New Audience Studies’ to describe a body of 
work on audiences in which, he contends, “the question of an ideological level of 
media processes ... has slipped almost entirely off the main research agenda” (p. 
267). These remarks signal a break between old and new audience researches 
although no truly firm line can be drawn between audience research based in 
encoding/decoding theory and the ‘New Audience Studies’ (NAS).3
                                                 
3   Consequently, it is an external label and not one which authors associated with it would 
necessarily welcome. Examples of research which could be included in this category include 
Ang (1985), Jenkins (1992), Stacey (1994) and essays in Seiter et al. (1989). 
 Furthermore 
(as I shall discuss below), the NAS do not represent a careless departure from 
political concerns. Yet, if there is no historical moment which would define the 
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terms ‘before’ and ‘after’, there certainly has been a shift in terminology from 
‘ideology’ to ‘discourses’, and from ‘reception’ to ‘production’ of meaning. A 
turn away from media texts, and from the idea that an essence of is meaning 
locked into them, has enabled a new research focus on the “infinite, 
contradictory, dispersed and dynamic practices of and experiences of television 
audiencehood enacted by people in their everyday lives” (Ang, 1991, p. 14).    
 
The position of the text within the NAS framework is consequently quite 
different from its positioning by the ideological frameworks described above. In 
fact, the text almost threatens to disappear as the spotlight is trained on ‘actual 
audiences’ who now are understood as active, creative and sometimes critical 
producers of the cultural texts available to them. These phenomena (the 
simultaneous disappearance of the text and emancipation of the audience) can be 
explained as the effects of a move by NAS researchers away from a transmission 
model of communication, and towards something like the model of 
communication as position discussed by Sless (1986). Here I would like to turn 
again Sless’ communication model which (though describing the process of 
communication at an abstract level) is lucidly applicable to media theory. In the 
transmission model (which seems to underly ideological approaches to media) 
meaning is transferred from author, via text, to reader. According to Sless, rather 
than these three positions (author, text, reader), we can better conceive the 
communication process in terms of just two: the author/text and the reader/text 
(pp. 32-34). The text is not then a separate entity; it is indivisible from the acts of 
authoring and reading which, in different ways, ‘produce’ it. So, the notion of 
‘the text itself’ becomes untenable as we instead imagine, within any act of 
communication, the existence of at least two texts. Communication is rewritten 
by Sless as a matter of position rather than transmission: “there is a great deal to 
recommend a metaphor based on the idea of a landscape within which are located 
both the researcher and the object of study” (p. 31). 
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The ‘New Audience Studies’ 
 
 
TEXT AUDIENCE 
 
Passive  
 
Produced by industry  and audience; 
provides ‘raw materials’ for readings 
 
 
Significant as a focal point around which 
an interpretive community comes 
together 
Active 
 
Meaning resides in the readings produced 
by active audiences who select, critique, 
poach, enjoy 
 
Researchers seek out community of 
readers and examine their diverse reading 
practices and pleasures 
 
The celebrated ‘activity’ of the audience has been perhaps media studies’ greatest 
bone of contention in the 1980s and 90s. Morley (1994), aware that his own work 
is widely cited as evidence of this activity, protests that audiences are often now 
presented as routinely critiquing the representations they are offered and 
therefore able to ‘deflect’ any harmful effects. Against this tendency there has 
been a growing insistence that active or ‘resistant’ readings of texts not be taken 
as a sign that audiences are powerful in anything like the sense that transnational 
media empires are powerful (Morley, 1994; Hughes, 1996; Nightingale, 1993; 
Corner 1991).  
 
Though in agreement with this latter point, Morley (1994) takes issue with 
Corner’s (1991) suggestion that the turn to audiences represents a depoliticising 
trend within media studies. The trademark focus of ethnographic media research 
(much of which has also been underwritten by a feminist project) is on the 
particularity of experiences, on differences rather than sameness.  As such, it 
rejects any false division between macro/political and micro/personal, instead 
understanding “macro structures [as] reproduced only through microprocesses” 
(Morley, 1994, p. 259).  
 
In an insightful article entitled ‘Producing Audiences’, Patrick Hughes (1996) 
has attempted to reformulate the ‘productivity’ of audiencehood taking into 
account both the activity of the audience and the political economy of the media. 
Hughes suggests that audiences    
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‘actively’ produce meanings around cultural products as part of the 
continuing construction and reconstruction of their subjectivity/ies 
or sense(s) of self, but they do so within discursive repertoires which 
are increasingly liable to be determined by the dominant players in 
the [communications and cultural industries]. (p. 95, my emphasis) 
 
 
At the level of the ethnographic, then, researchers can gain information about the 
uses that audiences put their limited agencies to. But there can be no ‘free market’ 
in discourses, subjectivities and representations. While critical power over 
popular media texts is an essential survival strategy in late modernity, it does not 
absolve those texts from theoretically informed scrutiny. 
 
 
C o n c l u s i o n :   
t h e  a u t h o r ’ s  r e t u r n  
 
In examining these debates, I have attempted to argue for a theory in which 
audiences are understood as active participants in the process of making 
meaning. At the same time, I have attempted to show that the author (whether 
defined as a person or group) of a text does not determine once and for all how it 
is to be read. Nevertheless, the way in which the text is put together (including, 
but not limited to, the selection and sequence of words and images) must 
constrain the range of readings that can reasonably be made: as Hall (1980) 
recognised, polysemy is not an infinite plurality. Textual analysis can operate, I 
think, in this realm where the text both opens itself to plural meaning and 
attempts to fix certain meanings.  
 
The dual phenomena of audience research’s apparent ‘return to the real’ (‘here’s 
what REAL people REALLY think about...’), on top of the quite valid critiques 
which have been mounted against structuralist textual analyses, have served (at 
least for some) to undermine the legitimacy of textual analysis in general. That is, 
there is a danger that audience research can be held up as having privileged 
access to the ‘truth’ of what a text is about. However, a closer look at audience 
research itself demonstrates that there is actually no escaping textual analysis.  
Audience research, while often paying little attention to the media text, seeks out 
data from a certain audience (as constituted within the research itself) and then 
interprets it. Audience studies therefore are the researcher’s (partial, situated) 
interpretation of an interpretation, or analyses of the audience text rather than the 
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media text (Hartley, 1993; Mayne, 1993; Morley, 1989, 1992; Hughes, 1996). 
These remarks are not intended as a criticism of audience research, which is no 
more ‘subjective’ than any other research method. This is precisely my point: 
knowledge based upon a prior claim by the researcher to being ‘outside’ (of 
ideology, of culture, of audiencehood) must be treated with caution.  
 
A text only ‘means’ within specific spaces of encounter with its author(s) and 
reader(s), spaces which are situated within history, society and culture. So, as 
Janet Staiger (1993) points out, a reading of a text should be understood as an 
event, never to be repeated in quite the same way. The text can never be pinned 
down to an identifiable ‘true meaning’. However, rather than take this fact as 
evidence that textual analysis must inevitably fail, we should move beyond the 
essentialist and illusory notion of the ‘true meaning’ itself (true to whom, when, 
in what culture?). As I see it, media studies (of whatever methodology) might 
rather focus on the multiple ways in which identities are articulated and 
constructed, contradicted and negotiated, across that blurred boundary between 
cultural representations and realities.  
 
It is crucial that this debate does not remain trapped within the binary terms of 
‘text versus audience’, textual analysis versus audience research.  Whether the 
audience or the text is to be focal point for analysis, it is necessary to move 
beyond a faulty model of communication as transmission, and to recognise that 
the implied, unitary, normative subject often taken for granted in media analysis 
does not exist. The media researcher, much like the ‘ordinary’ media audience 
member, enters a world of texts demanding to be read and re-read. The difference 
between textual analysis and audience analysis consequently becomes one of 
emphasis, where the former emphasises the author/text relation, and the latter the 
reader/text relation.  
 
It is worth considering the significance of the author/text relation for media 
studies. Perhaps it is fair to say that reports of the death of the author have been 
greatly exaggerated. Glance sideways from media studies at adjacent 
communication fields (such as public relations, journalism, rhetorical and  
literary studies, media production) and the concept of the author seems alive and 
well. Yet, in media studies, it is commonplace, almost axiomatic, to claim that 
what the makers of the text intended is somehow unimportant or irrelevant to the 
task at hand. Instead, special tools will be used to (a) find out what it really means 
by reading the cultural unconscious though the medium of the text or (b) find out 
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what it really means by asking the audience what they think it really means 
(because what the author intended is obviously unimportant). This mass denial of 
authorship is presented as somehow more theoretically rigorous than asking 
‘simplistic’ questions about what an author intended; again, I quote Sless (1986): 
“the author always creates an image of a reader; similarly the reader creates an 
image of an author” (p.35).   
 
When I say that textual analysis could emphasise the author/text relation, I mean 
that the researcher, although accessing the meanings of the text from the position 
of reader, attempts to look through the text at the author. While available 
knowledge of the actual author can be very limited, there is nevertheless 
use-value in asking ‘why was the the text constructed this way rather than another 
way?’, ‘what projected audience was this text designed for?’, and also, ‘how do I 
respond to this text and why?’. This, I think, is what Kobena Mercer (1991) 
means when he calls for cultural studies to consider the ‘politics of enunciation’. 
Using the example of Robert Mapplethorpe’s controversial photography of black 
male nudes, Mercer asserts that there can be no simple classification of the 
images as ‘negrophilia’ or ‘negrophobia’: 
 
the statement ‘the black man is beautiful’ takes on different 
meanings... Does the same statement mean the same thing when 
uttered by a white woman, a black woman, a white man, or a black 
man? Does it mean the same thing whether the speaker is straight or 
gay? (p. 193) 
 
So, a reader’s projected image of authorial identity and intent is an integral part of 
the process of reading. 4
 
 And just as the ‘reader/text’ contains a projected 
‘author/text’, so too must we, as researchers, reflect on just what it means when 
we become authors of theory and analysis and design messages for our imagined 
readers.  
As mentioned above, media researchers have in the past tended to claim for 
themselves a sort of non-position outside of the communication processes they 
analyse.  According to Sless (1986), such researchers claim objectivity and yet, 
ultimately, “are actually studying their own readings of texts, offering their 
imagination as evidence” (p. 22). The problem, I think, lies not so much in the 
fact of researchers studying our own readings of texts, but in the failure to 
                                                 
4 Only if we recognise this complex interplay of positions does the notion of ‘reading against 
the grain’ become viable. 
Leo Havemann  Method or Madness? 
15 
acknowledge locatedness as a necessary condition of knowledge rather than an 
impediment to it. Where in fact, can anyone claim to speak from, except from the 
self? Rather than ignoring or lamenting subjectivity, the self can be ‘put to work’ 
for us; as Elspeth Probyn (1993) suggests: “I consider the possibilities of 
speaking selves to be great, and the liabilities of an untheorized return to the ‘I’ to 
be even greater” (p. 11).5
 
  
The ‘I’ from which analyses of media texts (and audiences) emerge has too often 
been grounded in the ‘authority’ of the expert, abstract subject. Yet, at the other 
pole, there is a risk of ‘authorising’ a kind of essentialist, and yet ultimately 
relativising discourse: ‘my experience was this, therefore I can’t be wrong’. As 
an alternative, we might turn the insights into subjectivity offered by discourse 
theory back on ourselves. In critically, and questioningly, speaking from the site 
of the multiply constituted self (a self which is raced but also, to begin with, 
classed and gendered) we might begin to produce different forms of knowledge. 
We can never piece together a true and complete map of the world. Instead, we 
will have albums and albums of unique snapshots. 
 
                                                 
5 And see Couldry (1996) for a compellingly argued appraisal of Probyn’s work. 
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